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Abstract
We study product market competition between firm owners (principals) where work-
ers (agents) decide on their efforts and, hence, on output levels. Two worker com-
pensation schemes are compared: a piece rate compensation as a benchmark when
workers’ output performance is verifiable, and a contest-based compensation scheme
with variable, revenue-based prizes when it is only verifiable who the best performing
worker is, i.e., only ’contest performance’ is verifiable. Without rivalry between firms,
the two compensation schemes lead to the same results. In case of product market
competition, however, contest-based compensation schemes lead to more employ-
ment, more production, and lower firm profits. The reduction in profits represents
the cost of being only able to verify workers’ contest performance instead of output
performance.
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21 Introduction
Standard principal-agent models, as discussed in institutional economics, usually
concentrate on a firm’s internal organization and analyze compensation contracts
between a single principal, the firm owner, and one or more agents, the workers (see,
e.g., Laffont and Martimort 2002 or Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo 1997). In
industrial economics, compensation contracts are studied in a broad class of strategic
competition models. However, in contrast to the standard principal-agent models,
the agents in these models are usually managers but not workers (see, e.g., the
survey in Sengul, Gimeno and Dial 2012). The link to the principal-(worker)agent
models is the design of compensation contracts for workers in case of product market
competition.
In this paper, we analyze competing firms, each consisting of one owner and several
workers who decide on effort levels anticipating how these decisions affect their effort
costs. The basic principal-agent framework with risk-neutral individuals is therefore
extended to account for strategic interaction between owners and workers of firms
on oligopolistic product markets. We compare two prominent worker-compensation
schemes, one relying on piece rates and one relying on a contest-based compensation
scheme with a variable, revenue-based contest prize. While piece rates are based on
output performance, revenue-based contest schemes can also be implemented when
worker output is not verifiable. Rather, in order to implement contest-based com-
pensation schemes, owners only need information on workers’ contest performance.
The paper combines two strands of literature. On the one hand, Gershkov, Li and
Schweinzer (2009) have analyzed the design of contests within teams but neglected
the relationship between worker agents and owner principals as well as product
market competition. In contrast, we point out the role of the principals of rival firms
in strategic competition and thus depart from the contest literature that has focused
on contests in monopoly firms. On the other hand, Gu¨th, Pull and Stadler (2015)
have analyzed piece-rate and revenue-sharing contracts in the context of product
market competition and vice versa. We deviate from this paper in several directions.
First, we consider a contest-based compensation scheme by introducing a contest-
success function. Second, we analyze the payment of an optimal fixed salary in
addition to the performance-based compensation components. This allows principals
to reduce the (expected) net utility of workers to a given reservation level. Third,
3we focus on firm profit rather than firm surplus when assessing the effects of the two
compensation schemes. Due to positive reservation utilities of workers, firm profits no
longer coincide with firm surpluses and hence the set-up of the optimization problems
changes. Last not least, we extend both strands of literature by endogenizing the
optimal number of workers employed by the firms and show that the employment
levels differ according to the compensation scheme in use.
Our analysis shows the dominance of the piece-rate compensation scheme which re-
produces the market performance of unitary firms. Contest-based revenue-sharing
schemes unavoidably trigger strategic-competition effects, implying higher employ-
ment and output levels and lower firm profits.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we analyze piece-
rate compensation as a benchmark and show that the market performance of unitary
firms is reproduced. In Section 3, we analyze a contest-based compensation scheme
where the best workers’ prizes depend on the firms’ revenue shares, and compare
the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Piece-Rate Contracts
We consider a heterogeneous product market with two firms i = 1,2, each producing
a substitute good. The firms’ inverse demand functions are
pi = 1−qi− γq j ; i, j = 1,2, i 6= j ,
where γ ∈ [0,1] measures the intensity of competition. In the limit case of γ = 0
the market is separated into two monopoly markets such that there is no strategic
interaction between firms. In the opposite limit case of γ = 1 the products are perfect
substitutes and the market is homogeneous, inducing intense competition between
firms.
The single input factor of production is the effort ei,k of workers k = 1, ...,ni in each
firm i = 1,2, where the effort-cost function is quadratic, i.e. c(ei,k) = e2i,k/2. The
output of firm i is a linear aggregation of individual effort levels and amounts to
qi = ∑nik=1 ei,k.
4Each firm consists of one owner (principal) and ni workers (agents). The game has
two stages: in the first stage, the owners i = 1,2 simultaneously write observable
piece-rate contracts with their workers, specifying the fixed (positive or negative)
payment fi and a (positive) piece rate wi per output unit, i.e. per unit of effort.
Workers are awarded according to these contracts and suffer from effort cost of
production, i.e. they realize net utilities
Ui,k(wi,ei,k) = fi +wiei,k− e2i,k/2 , i = 1,2, k = 1, ...,ni .
In the second stage of this piece-rate (PR) compensation game, workers maximize
their net utilities with respect to efforts ei,k. The first-order conditions are
e∗i,k = wi , i = 1,2, k = 1, ...,ni .
Since worker effort depends on the firm-specific piece rate wi only, there is neither
intra- nor interfirm interaction between workers.
When the reservation utility, resulting from alternative compensation-contract offers
in other markets or from unemployment benefits, is given by U ≥ 0, workers receive
the fixed payment fi =U−w2i /2 such that the reduced-form profit functions of the
firms can be written as
pii(wi,w j,ni,n j) = (1−nie∗i − γn je∗j −wi)nie∗i −ni fi
= (1− (ni+1/2)wi− γn jw j)niwi−niU , i, j = 1,2, i 6= j . (1)
In the first stage, owner principals maximize profits with respect to the number of
workers ni and piece rates wi. The respective first-order conditions are
[1− (2ni+1/2)wi− γn jw j]wi−U ≥ 0 (2)
and
[1− (2ni+1)wi− γn jw j]ni = 0 . (3)
We distinguish two cases: one where firms are restricted with respect to the number
of available workers and one with an unrestricted optimum of employed workers. In
the special case ofU = 0, for example, firms are obviously restricted by the number of
5available workers, since the first-order conditions (2) and (3) imply the employment
of an infinite number of workers (see Gu¨th, Pull and Stadler 2011, 2015).
Solution of the PR compensation game in case of a limited worker supply
When firms are restricted by a limited market-specific worker supply, inelastically
given by 2n workers, it follows from the first-order conditions (2) and (3) that prin-
cipals prefer to employ as many workers as possible such that the symmetric equi-
librium is characterized by n1 = n2 = n, i.e., the number n of workers employed by
each firm represents half of the market-specific worker force. The optimal piece rates
and worker efforts per firm are
w = ePR =
1
1+(2+ γ)n , (4)
leading to the prices
pPR =
1+n
1+(2+ γ)n
and firm profits
piPR =
(1+2n)n
2[1+(2+ γ)n]2 −nU . (5)
It becomes obvious that efforts, prices and firm profits are decreasing in the intensity
of competition γ. Furthermore, while worker efforts and prices are decreasing in the
number of employed workers, firm profits are increasing. The numerical solutions
for n = 2 workers per firm and a common worker reservation utility of U = 2/900
are presented in Table 1 for the two extreme cases of minimal (γ = 0) and maximal
(γ = 1) intensities of competition.
Table 1: Results for the PR compensation game with n = 2 workers
w ePR pPR piPR
γ = 0 0.200 0.200 0.600 0.196
γ = 1 0.143 0.143 0.429 0.098
6The piece-rate compensation scheme reproduces the market performance of uni-
tary firms. This can be seen immediately from equation (1) which coincides with
the profit equation of unitary firms being able to decide directly on worker efforts.
This equivalence even holds in case of product market competition since there is no
strategic-competition effect of piece rates on the efforts of the rival firm’s workers
(see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Two-stage competition in the PR game
w1
w2
e1
e2
pi1
pi2
Solution of the PR compensation game in case of an unlimited worker supply
When firms are not restricted by a limited worker supply, the first-order conditions
(2) and (3) give the optimal interior number of employed workers1
nPR =
1−
√
2U
(2+ γ)
√
2U
, (6)
depending negatively on the intensity of competition γ and the reservation utility
U . This leads to the piece rates and efforts
w = ePR =
√
2U , (7)
1Alternatively, one could account for a decreasing marginal product of worker effort to derive
an interior optimum (see, e.g., Das 1996). However, such a model would no longer be tractable for
the analysis of different compensation schemes under product market competition.
7prices
pPR =
1+
√
2U
2+ γ ,
and firm profits
piPR =
(1−
√
2U)2
(2+ γ)2 . (8)
Firm profits are decreasing in the reservation utility U of workers as well as in the
intensity of competition γ. Table 2 shows the numerical solutions for U = 2/900 and
the two extreme cases of minimal and maximal intensities of competition.
Table 2: Results for the PR compensation game with optimal numbers of workers2
nPR wPR ePR pPR piPR
γ = 0 7 0.067 0.067 0.533 0.218
γ = 1 5 0.067 0.067 0.356 0.097
To conclude, piece-rate compensation schemes reproduce the market outcome of a
unitary firm. However, piece-rate compensation schemes can only be implemented
when workers’ individual output units are countable and verifiable. In practice, this
is often not the case. Rather, principals may only be able to measure relative per-
formance, e.g., in the form of contest performance. Besides economizing on mea-
surement costs, contest-based compensation schemes have many advantages, among
others their ability to filter common risks. Therefore, incentive schemes where bonus
payments, luxurious trips or promotions are awarded based on workers’ contest per-
formance are widespread (see, e.g., Backes-Gellner and Pull 2013).
3 Contest-Based Compensation Contracts
As an alternative to piece-rate compensation schemes, we analyze an incentive device
where principals each decide on a revenue share si ∈ [0,1] which is distributed to the
2The equilibrium values in case of γ = 1 are calculated by using the optimal number nPR = 4.67,
i.e. by ignoring the integer constraint.
8“best”worker in terms of contest performance. Such a game is analyzed by Gershkov,
Li and Schweinzer (2009) for the monopoly case only. We extend their model by
investigating the influence of firm-owner principals competing in product markets,
and endogenize the number of employees.
As is well known, there are several institutional set-ups appropriate to convert
agents’ efforts into win probabilities in contests. Such approaches can be found,
e.g., in Hirshleifer and Riley (1992, Chapter 10), Fullerton and McAfee (1999), Baye
and Hoppe (2003) and are summarized in Konrad (2009). These microeconomic un-
derpinnings make a strong case for the contest success function µ = ei/(∑nik=1 ei,k) =
ei/qi.3 The prize of winning the contest is endogenously determined by the firm
owners and will depend on the firms’ revenues. In this revenue-sharing (RS) game,
each worker participating in the team contest expects net utility
EUi,k(si,ei,k) = fi + si(ei,k/qi)(1−qi− γq j)qi− e2i,k/2
= fi + siei,k(1−
ni∑
k=1
ei,k− γ
n j
∑
ℓ=1
e j,ℓ)− e2i,k/2 .
In the second stage of the game, risk-neutral workers maximize their expected net
utilities with respect to the efforts ei,k. The first-order conditions are
si(1− (ni+1)ei− γn je j)− ei = 0 ,
where ei,k = ei ∀ k = 1, ...,ni and e j,ℓ = e j ∀ ℓ= 1, ...,n j. The equation system is solved
by the equilibrium efforts
e∗i (si,s j,ni,n j) =
si(1+(1+(1− γ)n j)s j)
1+(ni+1)si+(n j +1)s j +((1− γ2)nin j +ni +n j +1)sis j
. (9)
Denoting the denominator of equation (9) by D, we derive the following comparative
statics:
de∗i /dsi = [1+(1+(1− γ)n j)s j][1+(n j +1)s2j ]/D2 > 0 ,
de∗i /ds j =− γn jsi[1+(1− γ)n j)si)]/D2 < 0 ,
de∗i /dni =− s2i (1+(1+(1− γ)n j)s j][1+(1+(1− γ2)n j)s j]/D2 < 0 ,
3This is a special case of the more general Tullock contest-success function µ = eri /(∑nik=1 eri,k),
where the ranking-precision parameter is normalized to r = 1.
9de∗i /dn j =− γsis j[1+(1+(1− γ)ni)si][1+ s j]/D2 < 0 .
The derivatives show that worker efforts are monotonically decreasing in the number
of workers employed by any firm. Furthermore, an increase in the revenue share
offered by an owner raises the efforts of own workers but reduces the efforts of the
rival’s workers.
By anticipating the equilibrium worker efforts and driving workers’ expected net
utility down to their reservation levels such that fi =U− siei(1−qi−q j)−e2i /2, the
owners face the profit function
pii(si,s j,ni,n j) = (1− si)(1−nie∗i − γn je∗j)nie∗i −ni fi
= (1−nie∗i − γn je∗j)nie∗i −ni(e∗i )2/2−niU , i, j = 1,2 ; i 6= j .
In the first stage, owner principals maximize profits with respect to the number of
workers ni and revenue shares si. The respective first-order conditions are
dpii(ni,e∗i (ni),e∗j(ni))/dni = ∂pii/∂ni +(∂pii/∂e∗i )(de∗i /dni)+(∂pii/∂e∗j)(de∗j/dni) ≥ 0
(10)
and
dpii(e∗i (si),e∗j(si))/dsi = (∂pii/∂e∗i )(de∗i /dsi)+(∂pii/∂e∗j)(de∗j/dsi) = 0 . (11)
Solution of the RS compensation game in case of a limited worker supply
As in Section 2, let us first assume that firms are restricted by the number of available
workers. It follows from the first-order conditions (10) and (11) that principals prefer
to employ as many workers as possible. When the whole market-specific worker force
is given by 2n workers, the symmetric equilibrium is characterized by the employ-
ment of n1 = n2 = n workers in each firm. Furthermore, the first-order conditions (11)
lead to an interior optimum for the revenue shares. Due to the partial derivatives
∂pii/∂e∗j =−γnin je∗i < 0 and de∗j/dsi < 0, the strategic term has a positive sign, indi-
cating an“overinvestment” in the revenue share devoted to the workers. Since worker
efforts are strategic substitutes in the sense of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer
(1985), owners choose the “top dog” strategy according to the taxonomy introduced
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by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). By inserting the corresponding expressions for the
partial and total derivatives in equation (11), the symmetric equilibrium revenue
shares are derived as solution to the quadratic equation
[(1− γ2)n2+n]s2− s−1 = 0 ,
which has the single positive root
s =
1+
√
1+4n(1+(1− γ2)n)
2n(1+(1− γ2)n) . (12)
The revenue share devoted to the workers as a whole is monotonically increasing
in the intensity of competition from s = 1/n in case of no competition (γ = 0) up
to s = (1+
√
1+4n)/(2n) in case of intense competition (γ = 1). In the symmetric
equilibrium the worker effort equation (9) simplifies to
eRS =
s
1+(1+(1+ γ)n)s . (13)
Effort levels are monotonically increasing in γ from eRS = 1/(1+ 2n) in case of no
competition (γ = 0) up to eRS = [1+
√
1+4n]/[1+4n+(1+2n)
√
1+4n] in case of
intense competition (γ = 1).
Given the effort levels, one obtains the prices
pRS = 1− (1+ γ)neRS ,
and firm profits
piRS = [1− (1/2+(1+ γ)n)eRS]neRS−nU , (14)
which are decreasing in the intensity of competition γ and the number of employed
workers n.
The numerical solutions for n= 2 workers per firm and a common worker reservation
utility of U = 2/900 are presented in Table 3 for the two extreme cases of minimal
(γ = 0) and maximal (γ = 1) intensities of competition.
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Table 3: Results for the RS compensation game with n = 2 workers
s eRS pRS piRS
γ = 0 0.500 0.200 0.600 0.196
γ = 1 1.000 0.167 0.333 0.079
A comparison with Table 1 shows that firm profits coincide with those of the piece-
rate compensation game in case of no competition (γ = 0). This would even hold true
in case of competition (γ > 0) if the compensation contracts were not observable by
the rivals. When observable, however, owners commit themselves in their decisions
on revenue shares, thereby unavoidably inducing strategic effects (see Figure 2).
Due to these strategic effects, owners raise the revenue shares devoted to workers,
thereby inducing higher effort levels, lower prices and lower firm profits. An impli-
cation of this result is that a compulsory disclosure of revenue-sharing contracts is
welfare-enhancing.
Figure 2: Two-stage competition in the RS game
s1
s2
e1
e2
pi1
pi2
Solution of the RS compensation game in case of an unlimited worker supply
When firms are not restricted by a limited worker supply, the first-order condi-
tions (10) hold with equality and determine an optimal interior number of employed
workers per firm.
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In case of separated monopolies (γ = 0), an explicit solution can be derived. The
revenue-share equation (12) simplifies to s = 1/n, the effort equation (13) to eRS(γ =
0) = 1/(1+2n) such that the reduced-form profit equation (14) can be written as
piRS(γ = 0) = n/(2+4n)−nU .
The first-order condition with respect to n leads to the interior optimum
nRS(γ = 0) = 1−
√
2U
2
√
2U
,
inducing worker effort eRS(γ = 0) =
√
2U , which coincides with the corresponding
solution (7) in the piece-rate compensation game. Therefore, we can summarize that
in case of γ = 0 the market outcomes of the two compensation schemes coincide with
nPR(γ = 0) = nRS(γ = 0) and ePR(γ = 0) = eRS(γ = 0). Obviously, in this limit case
(which is usually considered in traditional principal-agent models), there is no cost
of verifiability of relative worker output only.
In case of product market competition, however, the two compensation schemes
lead to different outcomes. Not only revenue shares but also the numbers of em-
ployed workers act as strategic variables via commitment on production quantities.
Since ∂pii/∂e∗j =−γnin je∗i < 0 and de∗j/dni < 0, the strategic term in the first-order
condition (10) has a positive sign, indicating an “overinvestment” in the number of
employed workers, again a “top dog” strategy.
By inserting the corresponding expressions for the partial and total derivatives in the
first-order condition (10), the symmetric worker employment levels are determined
implicitly by
[1− (1/2+(2+ γ)n)e]e
+n[1− (1+(2+ γ)n)e][(1+(1+(1− γ)n)s)(1+(n+1)s))]/D2
+ γ2n2es2[(1+(1+(1− γ)n)s)(1+ s)]/D2−U = 0 (15)
where e= s/[1+(1+(1+γ)n)] and s resulting from equation (12). Numerical calcula-
tions show that the number of workers is generally higher as compared to the case of
piece-rate compensation. In the example of U = 2/900, it follows from equation (15)
that the optimal number of workers per firm is given by nRS = 6 which corresponds
to the lower optimal number nPR = 5 in case of piece-rate compensation.
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Table 4 shows the numerical solutions for U = 2/900 and the two extreme cases of
minimal and maximal intensities of competition.
Table 4: Results for the RS compensation game with optimal numbers of workers
nRS s eRS pRS piRS
γ = 0 7 0.143 0.067 0.533 0.218
γ = 1 6 0.500 0.067 0.200 0.053
A comparison with Table 2 shows that firm profits again coincide with those of the
piece-rate compensation game in case of no product market competition. This would
also hold in case of product market competition if the compensation contracts were
not observed by the rivals. When observable, however, owners commit themselves not
only with respect to revenue shares but also with respect to the number of employed
workers. Due to the strategic effects, owners employ more workers, thereby inducing
a higher aggregate effort level, lower prices and lower firm profits.
To compare the performance effects of the considered compensation schemes in more
detail, Table 5 presents the firm profits for the unrestricted employment optima,
given by nPR(γ = 0) = nRS(γ = 0) = 7, nPR(γ = 1) = 5 and nRS(γ = 1) = 6 employed
workers, respectively, as well as the restricted optima with an equal employment
level of n workers per firm.
Table 5: Firm profits depending on the number of workers per firm up to the optimal
employment levels
n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5 n = 6 n = 7
pi(γ = 0) 0.164 0.169 0.208 0.213 0.216 0.217 0.218
piPR(γ = 1) 0.092 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.097 - -
piRS(γ = 1) 0.083 0.079 0.072 0.065 0.059 0.053 -
As a result of product market competition, firm profits in case of revenue sharing are
dominated by those in case of piece-rate compensation. When restricted to a limited
number of available workers, only revenue shares act as strategic variables, leading
to higher worker efforts and lower firm profits. When unrestricted, the numbers of
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employed workers act as additional strategic variables, driving workers’ aggregate
effort further in the same direction. From the perspective of firm owners, the decline
in profits can be interpreted as the cost of only observing a relative performance
(winning the contest) instead of the absolute performance of individual workers.
It depends on the technology and the opportunity cost of monitoring whether an
alternative compensation scheme might be preferable at all. Risk-neutral workers
are indifferent between the compensation schemes due to our assumption of a given
reservation utility, common to all workers, which will be realized in equilibrium.
Finally, consumers gain from a revenue-share compensation scheme which induces
more production and thus lower prices - but only if the strategic variables are ob-
served by the rival firms. An implication for the competition authorities is therefore
that compulsory disclosure of such compensation contracts is welfare-enhancing.
4 Summary and Conclusion
We studied product market competition between firms where owners decide on the
number of employed workers and implement a compensation scheme to which work-
ers react by choosing efforts and, hence, output levels. Depending on the verifiability
of workers’ performance, owners offer a piece-rate or a variable, contest-based com-
pensation scheme in order to maximize firm profits.
We showed the dominance of a first-best piece-rate compensation scheme when work-
ers’ output performance is verifiable. In practice, however, this might often not be
the case and piece-rate contracts might not be feasible. In these cases, a second-best
alternative could be a contest-based revenue-sharing compensation scheme that only
relies on the verifiability of contest performance. Without product market competi-
tion, this scheme leads to the same firm performance as the piece-rate compensation
scheme. Competition between firms, however, triggers strategic effects, implying
higher employment and output levels and lower firm profits. This reduction in prof-
its can be interpreted as the cost of being only able to observe workers’ contest
instead of their output performance.
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